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United States Air Force Space Command spends billions of dollars each year acquiring and
developing launch vehicles and space systems. The space systems in orbit must continu-
ally meet defensive and offensive requirements and remain interoperable over time. Space
Command can launch additional space systems only if it has a launch vehicle of sufficient
capability. Space planners using space and missile optimization analysis (SAMOA) consider a
24-year time horizon when determining which space assets and launch vehicles to fund and
procure. A key tool within SAMOA is an integer linear program called the space command
optimizer of utility toolkit (SCOUT) that Space Command uses for long-range planning.
SCOUT gives planners insight into the annual funding profiles needed to meet Space Com-
mand’s acquisition goals. The 1999 portfolio of 74 systems will cost about $310 billion and
includes systems that can lift satellites into orbit; yield information on space, surface, and
subsurface events, activities, and threats; and destroy terrestrial, airborne, and space targets.
(Planning: government. Programming: integer.)
“Therefore doth heaven divide the state of man in divers
functions setting endeavor in continual motion.”
William Shakespeare, Henry V
The Air Force created Space Command in 1982 toenhance the defense of the United States through
space superiority and to protect the country from
weapons of mass destruction (United States Air Force
2000). Space Command has five primary mission
areas: space support, space control, force enhance-
ment, force application, and mission support. The
space support mission area launches satellites and
other payloads into space and monitors them. The
space control mission area monitors and counters for-
eign activities. The force enhancement mission area
provides information on weather, navigation, intelli-
gence, and threats, and provides communications.
The force application mission area maintains and
operates an intercontinental ballistic missile system.
The mission support mission area provides the foun-
dation for all other mission areas through the depart-
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ments of civil engineering, logistics, security forces,
space training, education and exercise, and medicine.
Space Command spends billions of dollars a year
procuring and deploying launch vehicles and space
systems required for mission area tasks. By system, we
mean an existing system or a concept for a future sys-
tem. Every two years, Space Command updates its
strategic master plan that delineates the systems to
procure. The strategic master plan is the foundation
for Space Command’s contribution to the program
objective memorandum submitted to the secretary of
Annual Cost
System FOC Life ($ million)
Information systems or programs
National environment monitoring
satellite system
Will provide global data from various altitudes with weather
satellites in different orbits
12 16+ 516
National polar orbiting system Will aid in acquiring information about the terrestrial and space




Provides vehicles, alarm systems, encryption devices, motion
detectors, etc., to enhance the security of launch facilities
and weapon storage areas
0 26+ 7
Space-based radar system Will detect terrestrial and airborne objects 10 20+ 1022
Launch systems
Atlas and Delta launch vehicles Provide launches for, for example, global-positioning systems
and the space-based radar
0 6 33
Conventional strike system Used as a platform to deliver precision-guided bombs at
high velocity to terrestrial targets
0 25+ 50
Evolved expendable launch vehicle Will provide rapid launches of, for example, global-positioning
systems and the space-based laser more readily and cheaply
than current launchers
3 21 536
Space maneuver vehicle Will provide rapid launches of, for example, global-positioning
systems and the space-based laser, into various orbits
8 22+ 425
Defense systems
Helicopter replacement system Will provide upgrades (new airframes or updates) to the fleet
of helicopters (currently 25 years old)
9 26+ 18
Helicopter sustainment system Sustains the operational capability of 63 helicopters used
for command and control
0 26+ 15
Peacekeeper sustainment system Maintains the capability of the Peacekeeper intercontinental
ballistic missile to deliver up to 10 independently targeted
warheads with great accuracy
0 14 201
Space-based laser Will deliver through many satellites lethal thermal energy to
ground, airborne, and space targets
16 26+ 1209
FOC—years from fiscal year 2001 until full operational capability.
Life—number of years of planned operation.
+—the system is planned to remain operational until at least the end of the planning horizon.
Table 1: A sample of space systems shows their anticipated years of operation and their average annual cost. Space Command depends on sophisticated
and costly systems, such as these, to achieve its goal of air and space superiority. Each candidate system may offer options with various development
and operational schedules.
defense. The program objective memorandum is a
compendium of funding requests from all the military
services and defense agencies for the next six fiscal
years. Its purpose is to justify resource requirements
and programs that satisfy the secretary’s defense-
planning guidance.
Planning the procurement and deployment of
launch vehicles and space systems and justifying their
costs is challenging. The systems are sophisticated
and costly (Table 1). For example, space-based radar
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Figure 1: By adopting a candidate system, Space Command commits fixed expenditures over many years. It
would bear most of the $44 billion cost for this particular system from fiscal years 2014 through 2020 when most
of its components would be launched into space. This system would achieve full operational capability (FOC) in
2020.
will be used to detect terrestrial and airborne objects,
such as troops and satellites that may otherwise be
obscured in the visible spectrum. This system has
an average yearly cost of over $1 billion. The space
maneuver vehicle is a concept for a future system
expected to help Space Command maintain opera-
tional satellites; it has a projected yearly cost of $425
million. The conventional strike launch system is used
to propel precision-guided bombs at high velocity to
terrestrial targets. If the costs are spread over 24 years
of operation, the launch system will cost an aver-
age of $50 million yearly. The space-based laser will
deliver lethal thermal energy via satellites to ground,
airborne, and space targets and has an average yearly
cost of over $1 billion.
These systems require high up-front expenses
(Figure 1) compared with those currently in operation
or being shut down. They usually require years of
research and development before they become opera-
tional. For example, a launch vehicle and the corres-
ponding system to be launched require extensive
preparation for deployment, including ground sup-
port and personnel training. Once a space system has
been launched, the cost of maintaining it is a small
part of its total (life-cycle) cost, consisting primarily
of the costs of operating and maintaining ground sta-
tions and personnel.
We describe an integer linear program called the
space command optimizer of utility toolkit (SCOUT)
and its use within Space Command’s space and mis-
sile optimization analysis (SAMOA) to assemble the
1997 and 1999 strategic master plans submitted to
Congress. Early in SCOUT’s development, the US Air
Force asked us to refine the mathematical optimiza-
tion model for SCOUT and find ways to expeditiously
solve it. We met these requests between 1997 and
1999. SCOUT is a capital-budgeting model with some
distinguishing features: It is large and includes a long
time horizon, and it accounts for many dependent
and synergistic system alternatives and several types
of budget constraints.
Overview of SAMOA
SAMOA is a collection of analysis techniques Space
Command uses to select from hundreds of candidate
systems a set that best satisfies its requirements over a
24-year horizon. Each system option consists of a sys-
tem type, such as a launch vehicle (Figure 2), satellite,
or radar, and the start and stop dates of use. The num-
ber of launches required by type of vehicle and year
is an important consideration. Space Command used
SAMOA in 1997 and 1999 to develop Space Com-
mand’s strategic master plan.
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Figure 2: A Titan IVB missile launches a satellite from Cape Canaveral.
This expendable launch vehicle can boost up to 47,800 pounds into low-
Earth orbit or more than 12,700 pounds into geosynchronous orbit 22,300
miles above Earth. The payload joins a constellation of similar satellites
that Space Command uses to provide early warning of missile launches
worldwide (US Air Force 2001). The launcher and the satellite are compo-
nents of separate space systems, but the satellite requires the launcher.
SAMOA consists of five steps: mission area assess-
ment, mission needs analysis, mission solution analy-
sis, portfolio selection, and refined-portfolio selection.
In the assessment step, mission area teams follow
current administration guidance to divide mission
areas into measurable operational tasks that Space
Command needs to accomplish. Each planning area
consists of a set of goals or target capabilities, and
achieving each target capability requires that Space
Command perform some set of tasks. For example,
to achieve aerospace superiority, it must dominate the
air and operations in, from, and through space. Air
domination consists of two tasks: suppressing adver-
saries’ air defenses and neutralizing adversaries’ air
and cruise missile capabilities. Table 2 shows the eight
planning areas with their associated capabilities.
Planning Areas Associated Capabilities
Aerospace superiority To dominate air and space operations
Rapid global mobility To deploy space assets to provide access to,
from, and through space
Global attack and To attack surface targets
precision engagement
Information superiority To conduct offensive and defensive
counter-information operations and to gain
and exploit information on events and threats
Global awareness and To monitor and assess conditions
command and control and to plan and execute military operations
Agile combat support To protect and sustain forces and to support
military and government installations
Quality people To recruit, train, promote, and retain personnel
Innovation To support new developments
Table 2: Mission-area assessment organizes Space Command’s capabi-
lities into eight planning areas. Each planning area consists of a set of
capabilities, and each capability requires that some set of tasks be com-
pleted. For example, achieving aerospace superiority requires dominating
operations in, from, and through space. Air domination consists of two
tasks: suppressing adversary air defenses and neutralizing adversaries’
air and cruise missile capabilities. Space domination consists of five
tasks: protecting friendly (allies’) space capabilities, protecting friendly
missile capabilities, neutralizing adversaries’ space capabilities, provi-
ding national and theater missile defense, and operating space assets.
In the needs analysis step, the teams identify the
end objectives for each task and any existing shortfall
Space Command has in achieving a particular task
with a current system. The teams score current sys-
tems against tasks and assign measures of shortfall
that indicate a system’s complete, partial, or lack of
coverage with respect to meeting a task.
In the mission solution analysis step, the teams
weight tasks to indicate priority, determine the abil-
ity of candidate systems to fulfill tasks (Parnell et al.
(1998) describe such an assessment), assess the costs
of systems, and arrive at the projected budget for
each year throughout the 24-year planning horizon.
A candidate system’s score is the weighted sum of
its contribution for each measure toward the cove-
rage (or value) it alone provides for each applicable
task. This score is normalized and rounded to the
nearest integer in the interval 010. The contribu-
tion from several candidate systems that perform the
same task can be the maximum contribution from
4
Interfaces
Vol. 33, No. 4, July–August 2003
BROWN, DELL, HOLTZ, AND NEWMAN























Figure 3: Space systems may perform better as synergistic-group systems. For a particular task, the synergistic-
group system A and B performs better than either of its components does independently. The synergistic-group
system A, B, and C also offers synergistic performance. Other combinations may not. The horizontal bar divid-
ing the performance of each synergistic-group system shows the contribution of the best component task; any
combined performance in excess of the contribution of the best component task is synergistic. Accounting for
synergy among systems is difficult when seeking to procure a maximal-performance portfolio of space assets.
any one of them, or perhaps more than this maxi-
mum if the systems act as a synergistic-group sys-
tem (Figure 3), which we define as contributing more
towards a particular task than what an individual sys-
tem would contribute, but not necessarily more than
the sum of the contributions from each system in the
group. For example, when operating alone, the mil-
star satellite, which encompasses an information sys-
tem that links ground, sea, undersea, and airborne
systems, provides 80 percent of what is needed to
perform the task of providing global-satellite commu-
nications; the extremely high frequency polar-interim
system, an information system that provides satel-
lite communications for the polar regions not reached
by other satellites, independently provides 70 per-
cent of what is needed to perform the same task; the
global-broadcast system, another information system
providing large-bandwidth one-way communications,
achieves 80 percent of this task; and the defense satel-
lite communication system, an information system
that provides high-priority, secure communication
between ground, sea, and air units of the US mil-
itary and other government agencies, lends 80 per-
cent towards performing this task. Together, and only
together, these systems acting as a synergistic-group
system provide 90 percent of what is needed to per-
form this task.
In the portfolio selection step, SCOUT selects a
set of candidate systems that best meet Space Com-
mand’s objectives while adhering to system opera-
tional constraints and budget limitations.
In the refined-portfolio selection step, Air Force offi-
cers rely on their expert judgment to evaluate and
modify the set of systems that SCOUT has selected.
The officers refine the recommendations based on
political considerations and other factors not easily
stated mathematically and thus not in SCOUT.
The mission area teams gather and prepare much
of SCOUT’s data in the first three steps of SAMOA:
mission area assessment, mission needs analysis, and
mission solution analysis. The teams categorize these
data in the following seven groups: task coverage
scores, system timing, launch timing, system and
launch vehicle annual costs, per-launch costs, launch
requirements, and budget restrictions.
Specifically, the teams assess each system’s ability
to perform each relevant task over three epochs: near-
term (first six years), mid-term (next eight years), and
far-term (the remaining 10 years).
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Associated with each system is a list of possible
start and stop years. In addition, the contractor buil-
ding the system specifies the lead time for each sys-
tem, that is, the number of years before it will become
operational. By including lead times, the team enables
the model to account for the cost of the system during
the years it is not in operation.
Each system has a set of potential launch times.
The yearly system and launch-vehicle costs (except
per-launch costs) run from the first year of research
and development through the last possible year of
operation.
The per-launch costs for each launch vehicle are a
function of the operational dates of the systems that
require launches and the number of times a launch
vehicle provides launches over its lifetime. The total
costs associated with the latter are accounted for by
specifying for each launch vehicle (1) which launch
vehicles are capable of launching and technologically
available to launch a given system into orbit, (2) the
annual number of launches required to build and
maintain the system constellation, and (3) the per-
launch costs for a launch vehicle.
The carrying capacity of each type of launch vehi-
cle dictates which payloads it can launch. The launch
requirements also specify how many launches each
system requires each year.
Based on congressional estimates, Air Force officers
specify the budget for each year and each set of years
throughout the planning horizon.
After the team assembles these data in the first
three steps of SAMOA, SCOUT selects optimal port-
folios, and the Air Force officers refine the resulting
solutions. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on
the two last steps in SAMOA.
Selecting an Optimal Portfolio
Using SCOUT
Once the teams define task requirements and assess
the ability of each candidate system and synergistic-
group system to meet these requirements, SCOUT
unravels all the complex interactions among candi-
date system options, including when Space Com-
mand can adopt them and what years it must
fund them, and selects an optimal portfolio of
investments.
Brown et al. (2003) characterize SCOUT as a long-
term capital-planning model, in contrast to civi-
lian long-term capital-budgeting models (Clark et al.
1989, Weingartner 1963). Related military optimiza-
tion models have been reported in the literature:
Brown et al. (1991) planned the long-term moderniza-
tion of the US Army’s helicopter fleet using a model
called PHOENIX, Loerch (1999) and Loerch et al.
(1999) discuss the long history and use of PHOENIX
progeny, while Donahue (1992), Ihde (1995), Carr
(1996), and Field (1999) present optimization-based
long-term capital-planning models using real data to
solve a variety of real military problems. Newman
et al. (2000) offer a comprehensive literature review.
SCOUT recommends a mix of system options and
launches that minimizes shortfalls in task perfor-
mance and takes into account constraints on budget
and launch vehicle demand and availability. It selects
at most one option for each system over the plan-
ning horizon, follows logic governing the precedence
and interdependence among candidate systems, and
adheres to bookkeeping relationships.
SCOUT selects candidate systems and launches
according to rules governing their compatibility and
interdependence. Launch capabilities must be suffi-
cient to provide the launches required for a given
candidate system, launch vehicle, and year. A launch
vehicle must be operational before it can be used.
A candidate system that depends on a primary sys-
tem can operate only if that primary system is also
in operation (Figure 4). For example, the security-
forces-modernization system (which provides secu-
rity for launch facilities) must be operational when
the peacekeeper-sustainment system (which main-
tains the Peacekeeper missile) is operational. Also, a
synergistic-group system depends on all of its com-
ponent systems.
A prerequisite system must start operating before
a candidate system that depends on it can start
operating (Figure 4). For example, the national-
environment-monitoring satellite system can start
operating only after the national-polar-orbiting sys-
tem, because the former requires the ground stations
of the latter for tracking its satellites.
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Figure 4: When a new space system can begin operating (join an operational portfolio) depends on the timing
of the other systems’ operations. System A starts operating during year y and stops after y . The concurrent
dependence of candidate system B1 on A restricts it to operating only when A does. The prerequisite dependence
of B2 on A prevents it from starting before A does. The contiguous dependence of B3 on A requires it to start
operating right after A ceases operation. In addition to these temporal dependencies, candidate systems are also
governed by constraints on the portfolio, such as “select at most (or exactly) n of these,” and by budget.
A contiguous-dependent candidate system must
start operating immediately after the related system
that it replaces stops (Figure 4). For example, the
evolved expendable launch vehicle must replace the
atlas and delta launch vehicles as soon as they cease
operation.
Space Command can procure, at most, one start-
date, stop-date option of a candidate system over the
planning horizon.
Space Command can procure, at most, one varia-
tion of a candidate system. Some systems that pro-
vide the same value differ in the technology they
employ and their use may be mutually exclusive.
For example, Space Command can choose either
the helicopter-replacement system or the helicopter-
sustainment system but not both, because replacing
the helicopter fleet is mutually exclusive with upgrad-
ing the existing fleet.
Space Command must procure one of the two or
more candidate systems that perform some required
task. For example, the five versions of space-based
radar will differ in how they track ground targets,
how they track air targets, how they reduce risk
to operating personnel, and how much area they
cover. Space Command must adopt one of these
versions.
Constraints on the annual Space Command bud-
get restrict the total planned costs, except launch
costs, which are budgeted separately. While the fully
operationally capable (FOC) year for a candidate sys-
tem is the first year that it contributes to performing
required tasks, the costs for a system may begin many
years earlier and may even continue after it ceases
Interfaces
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operation. The bulk of the costs for many systems go
for research, development, and initial deployment.
Some budget constraints restrict total costs for all
systems over five-year epochs, admitting some flex-
ibility for very expensive candidate systems such as
launch vehicles that can be manufactured ahead of
time and stored for future use.
The objective function for SCOUT expresses total
discounted penalty dollars, with terms for penalties
for annual shortfall in task performance and for viola-
tion of annual or epochal budget constraints. We can
adjust a penalty discount rate to reduce the influence
of far-term violations or not.
We give a simplified mathematical formulation of
SCOUT in the Appendix.
How Space Command Uses SCOUT
SCOUT iteratively determines a set of efficient port-
folios as follows. It seeks to discover a good solution,
and when it discovers one (say, within five percent
of integer optimality), it archives that portfolio. We
add a constraint to preclude that portfolio from reap-
pearing in the solution (Appendix), and we solve the
problem with this restriction. Eventually, the optimal
penalties grow as the quality of the restricted solu-
tions degrades, until SCOUT reaches a cutoff point.
Among all the selected portfolios, specific candi-
date investments may appear many times, and we
take these multiple selections as a signal that these
are attractive, robust candidates. We can fix alternate
candidate systems or specific system options in and
out of seed portfolios and use SCOUT to examine
the efficient fruits of these restrictions. Ultimately we
rely on expert judgment to decide which portfolio is
most attractive; this judgment is likely to incorporate
considerations exogenous to the optimization model.
For instance, an expert might judge that a portfolio
includes too many systems that depend on a single
technological development.
SCOUT reports the following for each portfolio:
(1) each selected system, along with its funding start
year, FOC year, and stop year; (2) the coverage each
selected system provides for each relevant task dur-
ing each year; (3) the maximum coverage the portfolio
provides for a task in each year; (4) the launchers to be
used for each satellite system, including the number
of launches a selected launch system provides each
year; (5) per-launch costs by year and launch vehi-
cle; (6) system expenditures by year, excluding launch
costs; and (7) total yearly expenditures (excluding
launch costs) compared with the yearly budget.
Senior Space Command decision makers carefully
review the selected mix of system options. They mod-
ify the portfolio based on their experience and judg-
ment. For instance, SCOUT may suggest expenditures
over the budget that they can mitigate or eliminate
by modifying the funding profile of a selected sys-
tem option. They may synchronize the start and stop
dates of selected system options with those of related
systems not considered in the model. Congressional
legislation may require Space Command to choose a
candidate system that SCOUT might not otherwise
recommend.
Space Command uses SCOUT initially without
forcing any selections. However, it is also useful for
optimally untangling the consequences of exogenous
must-buy restrictions. For instance, the political real-
ity of an administration’s stance on missile defense
may force Space Command to select certain technolo-
gies (or systems that contain those technologies).
Because SCOUT considers a finite planning hori-
zon, it suffers from end effects. SCOUT cannot see
the benefit of procuring a system that requires fund-
ing during the planning horizon but provides little
operational capability before the end of the horizon.
In the long term, such systems may be beneficial or
deemed necessary. For example, space-based radar
should prove valuable for many tasks, but because
it requires years of funding before it becomes opera-
tional, Space Command will begin to realize its bene-
fits only at the end of the planning horizon. SCOUT
and the strategic master plan both use a 24-year hori-
zon. The US Air Force uses only the first 18 years
of the strategic master plan in planning its procure-
ments. This mitigates end effects.
SCOUT sometimes lacks sufficient fidelity to dis-
criminate among small differences in task contribu-
tions. For example, it does not differentiate between
sensing objects in low, medium, or high Earth orbits.
Some systems cannot sense low orbits, and some can-
not sense high orbits. SCOUT might suggest only
8
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a single system, but an expert knows that two are
needed. Although the modelers could restate the task
requirements in finer detail and could repeat a lot of
analysis, sometimes it’s just easier to let experts fix a
problem.
Senior planners with experience and judgment are
essential for assessing the quality of proposed port-
folios. A senior SAMOA team chief for each mission
area certifies that the proposed portfolio responds to
that mission area’s requirements.
Decisions
In 1999, Space Command considered about 200 candi-
date systems for adoption in the 2002–2025 planning
horizon, each with associated options for start and
stop dates. The number of options for start and stop
dates varies dramatically by system. For example, a
satellite with a predetermined start date and a fixed
life span might have just one start-stop option, but a
launch vehicle that can be selected at various years
throughout the horizon and that has various possible
operating lifetimes might have 50 start-stop options.
The 200 candidate systems yielded about 5,000 feasi-
ble system options. Of the 200 systems, 27 were either
already operational or had already been selected.
Space Command was required to purchase an addi-
tional 19 systems because of congressional legislation
or by direction of senior officers; however, even for
these must-buy systems, the start and stop dates were
not predetermined and constituted an additional 20
options per required system. A total of 74 systems
appeared in the final strategic master plan portfolio
produced with SCOUT’s help.
Some of the important systems recommended for
purchase in 1999 are (1) the space-based laser, which
would help the US to dominate air and space opera-
tions by performing the following tasks: suppressing
adversary air defenses, neutralizing adversary air and
cruise missile capabilities, neutralizing adversaries’
space capabilities, providing national and theater mis-
sile defense, and neutralizing or countering an attack
from various types of targets; (2) minuteman sustain-
ment, which helps the US to dominate space opera-
tions and attack surface targets to protect its allies’
missile capabilities and neutralize various types of tar-
gets; (3) the evolved expendable launch vehicle, which
will deploy other space systems and lifts systems, for
example, global-positioning systems, that add signif-
icant military capabilities, for example, navigation, to
our space operations; and (4) a version of the space-
based radar that obtains information on space, surface,
and subsurface events, activities, and threats.
Several synergistic group systems chosen in 1999
include (1) the global broadcast system, the extremely
high frequency polar-interim system, the defense-
satellite-communication system, and the milstar sate-
llite; (2) the extremely high frequency polar-interim
system and the milstar satellite (a synergistic-group
system distinct from the system listed in (1)); and (3) a
conventional-strike system and the space-operations
vehicle, a combination of a space shuttle and a fighter
plane designed to conduct multiple military flights.
The first two groups provide enhanced tracking and
dissemination of information. The last group provides
enhanced launch capability.
Figure 5 shows the pattern of total investments
required by the system portfolio in the strategic mas-
ter plan. Figure 6 shows the total coverage of tasks
for the systems in the strategic master plan. A total of
10 points can be assigned to each task, and 34 tasks
require coverage. Although task coverage falls short
of the maximum 340 possible points, task coverage
does, in general, increase over time, and by the end
of the planning horizon, 29 of the 34 tasks gain some
coverage.
SCOUT is an optimization model, and optimiza-
tion models are notorious (and very useful) for find-
ing erroneous data. In 1999, initial trials with SCOUT
highlighted inconsistent cost units and some missing
cost data, resulting in our underestimating true costs.
SCOUT also identified relationships between candi-
date systems that were improperly defined because of
confusion between, for example, precedence and syn-
ergistic interactions. We fixed these errors before we
made the final model runs.
Conclusions
The strategic master plan for 1999 included planned
investments totaling about $310 billion. The congres-
sional impetus (US Government Accounting Office
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Figure 5: In the planned funding profile for the 1999 strategic master plan, a few important systems are depicted
separately (Space Command 2000, p. 116). The aggregate category mission support consists of such activities
as training flight-control officers. Other programs include such systems as a space warfare center; these systems
do not appear in the SCOUT optimization model but must fit into the total budget. Senior planners always need
to modify cost profiles and start and stop dates to produce a final budget. SCOUT gives these experts a starting
portfolio that is already reconciled in mathematical detail.
2000) calls for better-coordinated planning of space
and nonspace systems. SAMOA and, in particular,
SCOUT have provided Space Command with sound
guidance for its procurement decisions.
This planning effort is the best-staffed and most
scrupulously managed example of optimization-
based capital planning that we have ever seen. Since
1999, Space Command, along with several other
commands, Air Force Special Operations Command
and Air Mobility Command, have used SAMOA to
help create their strategic master plans. Since then,
SAMOA has also evolved and names have changed,
but this 1999 snapshot exhibits most of the tran-
scendent, distinguishing features of these important
capital-planning problems.
Appendix
SCOUT features both conventional and elastic con-
straints (Brown et al. 1997) and a linear objective func-
tion principally consisting of elastic penalty terms.
The elastic constraints admit solutions that would
customarily violate feasibility and charge a penalty
per unit violation. Elastic constraints are denoted by a
dot over the relational operator (e.g.,
.≤ .≥). For ease
of presentation, we have excluded the elastic variables
from the formulation, and we define compound index
10
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Figure 6: The system portfolio selected in 1999 provides coverage for planning area tasks that increases over
time, but it does not cover all tasks within every planning area. The coverage for each task is indicated on a
scale of 1 to 10, and 34 tasks require coverage (Space Command 2000, p. 144). Although task coverage falls
short of the maximal 340 possible points, it generally increases over time. By the end of the planning horizon,
29 of the 34 tasks receive some coverage.
sets only for the instances that exist. We give units
in brackets next to each definition. We give monetary
data in constant (1998) million dollars ($M). Newman
et al. (2000) provide a more detailed formulation.
Indices and Sets
s = candidate system (current system or concept for
a future system).

s = system that requires launching.
s = system that provides launching.
y = fiscal year (e.g., y = 1 20022 2003 	 	 	 ,
24 2025).
yy = start year, end year (first and last years of
operation).
s yy= candidate system option.
e = epoch (contiguous set of years).
e = set of contiguous years y in epoch e.
l = launch vehicle.
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k = task.
a= 1 	 	 	 A= performance achievement increment
(e.g., 1–10).
Data
budgety = budget allocated for year y [$M].
epochbudgete = budget allocated for epoch e [$M].
costsyyy = cost to develop candidate system option
s yy incurred in year y [$M].
launchcostsy = cost per launch with system s in year
y [$M per launch].
vehiclessyyy l =maximum number of launches that




syyy l = launch requirements for system
option 

s y y during y with vehicle l [launch].
performs k = how well system s performs task k
[value].
goalka = increment a of performance goal for task k
(values increase with a [value].
Decision Variables
SELECTs yy = 1 if system option s yy selected,
= 0 otherwise.
LAUNCHsy l = number of launches by system



















































SELECTs′y′y′ ∀ s contiguous after s′y′ (9)
SELECTs yy ∈ 01 ∀ s yy




Constraints (1) insure that at most one system
option is selected over the planning horizon. Con-
straints (2) determine task shortfalls by penalizing
any task, performance category, or year for which
no option offering sufficient performance is selected.
Constraints (3) accumulate the number of launches,
by type of launch vehicle and year, that are required
by the selected system options that require launches.
These launches may be required in years other
than those selected. Constraints (4) require selection
of launch system options sufficient to provide the
required launches by type of vehicle and by year.
Costs are incurred before a system starts operating
and may continue after it stops operating. Con-
straints (5) are annual elastic budget limits for expen-
ditures on selected options but exclude launch costs.
Constraints (6) elastically enforce epochal budget con-
straints on selected options, including launch costs.
Each constraint (7) requires that system s′ must
be operational if concurrent-dependent system s is
operational. Each constraint (8) ensures that sys-
tem s can start no sooner than prerequisite sys-
tem s′ does. Each constraint (9) stipulates that some
12
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contiguous-dependent candidate system s must start
operating right after system s′ stops operation. Con-
straints (10) state binary and nonnegativity require-
ments. Not shown are packing (or partition) con-
straints that ensure that at most n (or exactly n) of a
set of candidate-system options are selected over the
planning horizon. A packing constraint like this can
be used to rule out a portfolio: For example, to pre-
clude the complete set of systems in portfolio p, con-
sisting of P  systems and the set of system options
p, from simultaneous selection while still allowing
any proper subset of the systems, constrain
∑
s yy ∈p
SELECTs yy ≤ P −1	
The objective function expresses total constant-year
penalty dollars, with terms for penalties for violations
of annual shortfall in task performance and for annual
and epochal budget constraints (constraints (2), (5),
and (6), respectively).
For purposes of exposition, we have simplified
SCOUT here. For instance, we do not show the details
about the lag between initial funding and FOC years,
but it is an essential and complicating feature in
SCOUT. The objective function has an additional tie-
breaking term to encourage SCOUT to select a system
only when this provides a gain in task performance.
We also omit examples of trivial ad hoc side con-
straints (for example, to force selection of a system).
SCOUT typically exhibits about 10,000 constraints
and 5,000 variables, with half of these variables
binary. Solving SCOUT using commercially-available
optimization software to within five percent of opti-
mality usually requires less than an hour on a 500-
megahertz personal computer (Newman et al. 2000).
We can reduce SCOUT’s solution time by dis-
counting shortfall penalties so that far-term violations
have less influence. We also improve performance by
allowing research and development of concepts for
future systems to be funded without requiring that
a particular all-or-nothing binary option be selected.
This relaxation permits full funding to be committed
to an attractive future system but allows funding to be
spread fractionally among all its options. These and
other modifications preserve the essential essence of
SCOUT planning and make SCOUT much easier to
use (Newman et al. 2000).
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